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1 Introduction
From water management to air pollution, managing environmental problems efficiently re-
quires well-designed public policies or coordination among stakeholders (Ostrom, 1990). En-
vironmental policies are launched to mitigate the failure of market economy due to the presence
of negative externalities. Yet public intervention has an impact not only on the welfare of the
economy as a whole but also on the distribution of welfare. This paper addresses the dis-
tributional impact of environmental policies in economies with pollution. The model allows
for a variety of negative externalities including unilateral or multilateral ones, heterogenous
impacts due to distance or mitigation. It formalizes many complex environmental issues such
as water quality management in a river or the reduction of sulfur dioxide or greenhouse gas
emissions in an international setting.1
In this framework, we define a regulation mechanism as individual transfers contingent on
pollution emissions. In particular, we consider the mechanism inspired by a literal interpreta-
tion of the polluter-pays (PP) principle. It states that the costs of pollution should be borne
by the entity which profits from the process that causes pollution. Strictly speaking, it requires
that any agent (firm or consumer) compensates all agents who suffer from his pollution emis-
sions for the damage he causes. The PP mechanism is by construction budget-balanced. It
is also efficient in the sense that it uniquely implements the allocation of pollution emissions
that maximizes total welfare in Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the PP mechanism shares this
feature with the mechanisms proposed by Duggan and Roberts (2002) and Montero (2008).
Note however that here each agent only chooses his emissions whereas in Duggan and
Roberts (2002) each agent chooses his emission and reports the emission of his neighbor and in
Montero (2008) each agent reports his inverse demand for any level of emissions. The focus of
both papers is on the implementation of the efficient allocation under asymmetric information
whereas we are interested in the distributional impacts of a mechanism that implements the
efficient allocation under perfect information.
We examine the properties of the welfare distribution induced by regulation mechanisms.
We focus on two fairness criteria. The first one is that individual’s welfare is non-negative. It
1To that respect, it is as rich as the seminal model of Montgomery (1972).
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is a minimal acceptability requirement since an agent who obtains a negative welfare does not
benefit from the welfare-enhancing economy activities exhibiting pollution. The second criteria
relies on the concept of responsibility in axiomatic theory of justice (Fleurbaey, 2008). It makes
a polluter responsible for its pollution impact. More precisely, the welfare distribution should
be such that a polluter is assigned the full social cost due to his pollution. In particular, if a
polluter modifies the environmental impact of his own emissions in the economy, he should get
the full return or loss due to this change. For instance, a firm which filters its own emissions
to reduce their sulfur content should get the full benefit for the economy of its cleaning
investment. A farmer who uses more pesticide and fertilizers leading to dirtier waste water
should pay the social cost associated to this pesticide and fertilizer increase. We show that
the welfare distribution induced by applying the PP mechanism is the only one that satisfies
the two above criteria: non-negativity and responsibility for pollution impact.
We are also concerned by the acceptability of the PP principle. This is an important issue
since environmental policies emerge as a collective choice in democratic societies. Similarly,
international environmental agreements such as the Kyoto protocol are negotiated by sovereign
countries. Each country is free to refuse any agreement that is worse than the status-quo or
to join another agreement. We define acceptability as follows: a regulation mechanism is
acceptable if no other regulation mechanism assigns to any agent or group of agents a strictly
higher welfare (including no regulation at all). The PP mechanism fails to be acceptable
in general. For instance, the most upstream polluter of a river prefers laissez-faire to the
application of the PP principle. We nevertheless show that it is acceptable if externalities
are multilateral among homogeneous agents. This is for instance the case in most theoretical
models examining international agreements for greenhouse gas emission reduction including
Chandler and Tulkens (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994).
Our first characterization of the polluter-pays welfare distribution relies on the assumption
that marginal damage due to pollution does not depend on pollution concentration. When
marginal damage is increasing with pollution concentration, the incremental impact of each
polluter on damage is not straightforwardly defined. We extend the polluter-pays principle to
this framework by making the polluter pay for the incremental impact of his or her emissions
on society while victims of pollution are fully compensated for the damage caused by others.
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We then provide a further characterization of the PP welfare distribution in the more general
framework where marginal damage is increasing with pollution. More precisely, we show that
it is the unique welfare distribution that satisfies three criteria: non-negativity, responsibility
for pollution impact and solidarity upper bounds. The latter bounds require no agent to obtain
more than what he or she would get in absence of pollution of all other agents. We conclude the
paper by comparing the polluter-pays regulation mechanism with the Vickrey-Clark-Groves
(VCG) mechanism applied to the pollution problem.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple model of pollution with constant
marginal damages. It also provides several real-world examples which fit our framework. Sec-
tion 3 describes regulation mechanisms and their induced distribution rules in equilibrium.
It also discusses several regulations used in real life. Section 4 introduces the polluter-pays
regulation and characterizes its induced distribution rule in terms of non-negativity and re-
sponsibility for pollution impact. Section 5 discusses the acceptability of the polluter-pays
principle in societies. Section 6 generalizes our model to differentiate pollution and damages
and allows for increasing marginal damages. We generalize the PP principle to this environ-
ment and extend our main results to this framework. Section 7 concludes by comparing the
PP mechanism with the VCG mechanism.
2 A model of pollution
Consider a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents (countries, cities, farmers, firms, consumers,...).
Each agent i ∈ N is polluting or is polluted or both. Agent i enjoys a benefit bi(ei) from
production and/or consumption where ei ≥ 0 denotes the level of economic activity hereafter
called “emissions”. The benefit function bi is assumed to be both strictly concave and strictly
increasing from 0 to a maximum eˆi with b′i(eˆi) = 0 for every i ∈ N ,2 and twice continuously
differentiable: for all i ∈ N and for all 0 ≤ ei < eˆi, both b′i(ei) > 0 and b′′i (ei) < 0. We
normalize bi(0) = 0 and assume that the marginal benefit at ei = 0 is high enough (say
infinite) so it is optimal for all agents to produce and/or to consume.
Pollution from agent i causes a marginal damage aij ≥ 0 to agent j. The parameter
2This is without loss of generality since the maximum could be eˆi = +∞ for some i ∈ N .
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aij measures the magnitude of the pollution impact of i’s emission on j. For the moment we
consider constant marginal damages. Later we extend our results to environments with convex
damages and thus, increasing marginal damage from emissions. A (negative) externality or
pollution problem (N, b, a) is defined by a set of agents N , a profile of benefit functions
b = (bi)i∈N , and a matrix of externality/pollution marginal impacts a = [aij ]ij∈N×N . When
there is no confusion, we write for short a instead of (N, b, a).
Let Ri = {j ∈ N |aij > 0} denote the receptors of i’s pollution: the set of agents which are
polluted by i. Let R0i = {j ∈ N\{i}|aij > 0} denote the receptors of i’s pollution excluding
i. We assume that aii > 0 for any i ∈ N with R0i 6= ∅, i.e. if i is polluting other agents, then
his pollution also causes some damage at his location.3 Let Si = {j ∈ N |aji > 0} denote the
set of agents who pollute agent i. Let S0i = {j ∈ N\{i}|aji > 0} denote the set of agents
who pollute i excluding i. The environmental damage suffered by i in the emission vector
e = (ei)i∈N is therefore
di =
∑
j∈Si
ajiej .
The welfare of agent i with emissions e = (ei)i∈N is:
bi(ei)− di = bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Si
ajiej . (1)
The first term in (1) is i’s benefit from his own emissions whereas the second term is i’s welfare
loss due to pollution.
An efficient emissions plan e∗ = (e∗i )i∈N maximizes total welfare
∑
i∈N [bi(ei)− di] =∑
i∈N bi(ei)−
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Si ajiei. It satisfies the following first-order conditions for every i ∈ N :
b′i(e
∗
i ) =
∑
j∈Ri
aij . (2)
Note that our assumptions on the benefit function bi guarantee that e∗i is unique because
b′i(eˆi) = 0 and bi is strictly concave and strictly increasing between 0 and eˆi. The marginal
benefit of pollution emitted by i should be equal to its marginal damage for society. Let
W (a) =
∑
i∈N
bi(e∗i )−
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Si
ajie
∗
i
3For the environments considered here, this assumption is without loss of generality.
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denote the economy’s welfare from the efficient emissions plan e∗ in the problem (N, b, a). A
welfare distribution for the problem (N, b, a) is a vector z = (zi)i∈N such that
∑
i∈N zi ≤W (a).
A distribution rule φ associates with any problem (N, b, a) a welfare distribution φ(a) for a.
Note that a distribution rule identifies for each problem a welfare distribution which the society
may wish to implement.
The externality problem (N, b, a) exhibits multilateral externalities if Si = Ri for any
i ∈ N . The problem (N, b, a) exhibits unilateral externalities if S0i ∩ R0i = ∅ for any i ∈ N .
Let V ⊆ N denote the set of agents who do not pollute other agents and only suffer from
pollution due to other agents’ activities. Formally, for any i ∈ V , aij = 0 for all j 6= i and
aji > 0 for at least one j 6= i, or equivalently R0i = ∅ and S0i 6= ∅; and without loss of
generality, eˆi = 0.4 Similarly, let P ⊆ N denote the set of agents who do not suffer from other
agents’ pollution: aij > 0 for some j 6= i and aji = 0 for all j 6= i, that is R0i 6= ∅ and S0i = ∅.
Note that any agent in N\V is polluting the society from his economic activities.
Example 1 (The River Pollution Problem) Agents are countries, cities or factories lo-
cated along a river. The set of predecessors of i in the river is S0i while the set of followers of
i is R0i. Each agent i emits ei units of pollution which impact its followers downstream: one
unit emitted in i causes a marginal damage aij in j. Here the marginal damages aij may be
decreasing with respect of the distance of j to i, i.e. agent i’s emissions have a higher pollution
impact on immediate neighbors than on agents located further downstream the river. Sym-
metrically, agent i suffers from pollution emitted upstream by agents in S0i and by himself.5
It is a case of unilateral externalities: if we take two agents i and j, either i is upstream j
or i is downstream j, i.e. i ∈ Rj or i ∈ Sj. In a single canal or one-tributary river, agents
can be ordered according to their position from upstream to downstream. In this case, if
N = {1, ..., n} and if agents suffer from their own pollution (e.g. countries), then for any
i ∈ N , Ri = {1, 2, . . . , i} and Si = {i, i+ 1, . . . , n}. Moreover, for any i and j, if j ∈ Ri then
Rj ⊆ Ri. Symmetrically, if j ∈ Si, then Sj ⊆ Si. The latter properties might not hold in
4If eˆi > 0, then agent i’s activity does not have any impact on society and his activities can be disregarded.
5In the case of a river, “linearity is a good approximation up to the point at which the river becomes so
overloaded with organic material that oxygen (needed for aerobic bacteriological decomposition) is depleted.
At that point, [refereed as the river carrying capacity] the river’s capacity to clean itself is greatly diminished.”
from Kolstad (2000) footnote 2 page 177.
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more general rivers. With several tributaries that end up on the same main course, for any
agent i there might be k, j ∈ Si but both k /∈ Sj and j /∈ Sk. Symmetrically, for river deltas
or irrigations ditches originated from a source or weed or reservoir, we have the reverse: for
any agent i there might be k, j ∈ Ri but k /∈ Rj and j /∈ Rk.6
Example 2 (The International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Game) Players are coun-
tries. Each country i enjoys a benefit bi from its own greenhouse gas emissions ei. Greenhouse
gases emitted into the atmosphere cause global warming that damages countries’ economies.
The magnitude of global warming depends on total emissions on the earth surface
∑
j∈N ej .
Suppose that total emissions cause a constant marginal damage of δi to country i. In this
example, Si = Ri = N and aii = aij = δi for all i, j ∈ N : all countries exert multilateral
externalities on all other countries of the same magnitude. Yet countries differ on the dam-
age that externalities cause on their economy. Seminal papers on international agreements
for greenhouse emission reduction (Chandler and Tulkens, 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993;
Barrett, 1994) rely on these assumptions except that they consider convex damage (or concave
benefit of emission abatements) and, therefore, increasing marginal damage.
Example 3 (The International Acid Rain Game) Agents are countries emitting sulfur
dioxide (SO2) by burning coal for power production. This causes acid rain which damages
forests and ecosystems in neighboring countries. The parameter aij captures the marginal
impact of country i’s SO2 emissions to acid rain in country j. It depends on the fraction of
emissions from i that is deposited in j and its marginal damage on j. Ma¨ler and De Zeeuw
(1998) provide estimations on those parameters for 1990 and 1991 in Europe. For instance,
among the SO2 emissions from Belgium, 19.4% ended up in Belgium, 13.3% in Germany, 9%
in France, 4.8% in Netherland and so on. Ma¨ler (1989, 1994) considers an acid rain game
with such heterogeneous “transportation” parameters and constant marginal damage. This
game has been extended by Ma¨ler and De Zeeuw (1998) and Finus and Tjøtta (2003) to
environments with convex marginal damages.
Example 4 (Polluters versus Victims) Agents in V are individuals and those in P are
6See Ambec and Sprumont (2002) and Ambec and Ehlers (2008) for a rigorous analysis of the river water
sharing problem.
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firms and each agent belongs either to V or to P . Firms emit pollution without incurring any
damage: aij = 0 for every j 6= i. In contrast, any i ∈ V does not emit pollution but suffers
from pollution: eˆi = 0 for every i ∈ V and aji > 0 for at least one j ∈ P . In this case, aji
can be interpreted the marginal damage of each unit of firm j’s pollution causes to person
i in term of health or environmental impact. It depends on technologies, distance between
firms and individuals, climatic conditions, and so on. The victims of pollution might be firms
involved in different sectors than the polluter ones; for instance hotel and restaurants located
close to a lake or sea shore that might be polluted by local factories. The main difference with
the previous examples is that emitters and victims are disjunct sets of agents. It is a case of
unilateral externalities.
3 Regulation mechanisms and distribution rules
An important policy tool in pollution problems are regulation mechanisms. A regulation
mechanism t : RN+ −→ RN specifies for any emissions a vector of payments (or transfers)
t(e) = (ti(e))i∈N . It assigns to agent i the transfer ti(e) for any emissions plan e = (ei)i∈N .
Given the mechanism t and the emission plan e, agent i’s welfare under the vector t(e) is given
by
bi(ei)− di + ti(e) = bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Si
ajiej + ti(e). (3)
Of course, each agent i chooses his own emissions and for any problem a, the regulation
mechanism t induces an “emissions revelation game”. Let N (t, a) denote the set of (pure)
non-cooperative Nash equilibria in the emissions game under the mechanism t and the problem
a.
In the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of the externality problem with the mechanism
t, each player i maximizes (3) with respect to ei given e−i = (ej)j∈N\{i}. Let et ∈ N (t, a) be
a Nash equilibrium emission plan. Agent i’s equilibrium welfare under et is:
zti = bi(e
t
i)− dti + ti(et),
where dti =
∑
j∈Si ajie
t
j . The total welfare is
W t(a) =
∑
i∈N
zti =
∑
i∈N
[
bi(eti)− dti + ti(et)
]
=
∑
i∈N
bi(eti)−
∑
i∈N
dti +
∑
i∈N
ti(et),
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where in the last expression the first term is the total benefit from emission, the second is the
total damage and the third is the regulation mechanism surplus (or deficit if negative).
Given a distribution rule φ and a mechanism t, we say that t implements φ (in Nash
equilibrium) if for all problems a and all et ∈ N (t, a), we have
φi(a) = zti = bi(e
t
i)−
∑
j∈Si
ajie
t
j + ti(e
t).
A particular regulation mechanism is the laissez-faire mechanism tlf defined by tlfi (e) = 0
for all i ∈ N and all e ∈ RN+ . The laissez-faire mechanism represents situations without
regulation or where society chooses not to intervene. It implements the emissions plan elf =
(elfi )i∈N satisfying the following first-order conditions,
b′i(e
lf
i ) = aii,
for every i ∈ N . Thus, for each problem a, N (tlf , a) is unique and implicitly given by the
above equalities. In contrast to the efficient emissions plan e∗, under laissez-faire each agent i
considers the impact of his emissions only on his own welfare. In particular, elfi = eˆi if aii = 0.
As long as aij > 0 for some j 6= i, i.e. i’s emissions have an impact on another agent j, then
elfi > e
∗
i and therefore d
lf
j > d
∗
j for every j ∈ Ri.
Many regulation mechanisms are used in practice. For instance, consider a norm on pol-
lution emissions mechanism, denoted by t¯. It defines upper bounds on emissions e¯i ≥ 0 and
penalties for exceeding these bounds. Formally, let e¯ = (e¯i)i∈N and for all e ∈ RN+ ,
t¯i(e) =
 0 if ei ≤ e¯i−Fi(ei − e¯i) if ei > e¯i
for every i ∈ N where Fi > 0 is the fine in case of excess pollution (which can be infinite or
lump-sum). In case of an uniform norm, e¯i = e¯j and Fi = Fj for all i, j ∈ N . If the fine is high
enough to be persuasive and the norm is binding in the sense that elfi > e¯i for all i ∈ N , then
the unique emissions plan implemented in Nash equilibrium by t¯ are et¯i = e¯i for all i ∈ N .
The emission fee mechanism tf specifies fees f = (fi)i∈N on emissions and, therefore,
charges the payment tfi (e) = −fiei from agent i. Here fi > 0 is polluter i’s tax rate. The
Pigouvian fee is fi =
∑
j∈R0i aij for every polluter i ∈ N . It implements the first-best
emissions e∗ in Nash equilibrium. Alternatively, the fee can be on ambient pollution rather
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than on emissions. A pollution fee scheme tF charges Fj > 0 per unit of emissions at each
receptor j which leads agent i to pay tFi (e) = −
∑
j∈Ri aijFjei . The emission or ambient
pollution fee mechanism can be associated with a redistribution policy of the money collected,
e.g. through lump-sum transfers or subsidies.
A further important regulation instrument that can be embedded in our model is cap-and-
trade or tradable emission permits. Agents are endowed with some initial emissions allowances
or permits e¯ = (e¯i)i∈N which can be traded in a market. They are not allowed to emit more
than the amount of permits they own at the end of a pre-pollution trading phase. Providing
that the permit market is competitive (implying that agents are price takers), the tradable
emission permit regulation is as if each agent i faces a transfer scheme ttpi (e) = p(e¯i − ei)
where p is the equilibrium price of permits. This price is uniquely determined by the first-
order conditions b′j(e
t
j) − ajj = p for every j ∈ N\V and the market clearing condition∑
j∈N e¯j =
∑
j∈N e
t
j . The initial allocation of permits impacts the level and distribution
of welfare. Under grandfathering, each agent is assigned a share of his or her laissez-faire
emission e¯i = αe
lf
i with 0 < α ≤ 1. A lower α means lower emissions in the economy.
When permits are auctioned by the government, it is as if those who get the revenue from this
auction are endowed with the permits. For instance, if the money is used exclusively to reduce
or compensate the damage at agent h’s location, then it is as if agent h obtains all permits
and trades them with polluters in a competitive market, i.e. e¯h =
∑
j∈N\V e
t
j . Emission
allowances can also be defined on receptors emissions, each agent i potentially owning e¯ij
emission allowances at receptor j that can be exchange against other emission allowances for
the same receptor j.
Given the abundance of different regulation mechanisms in reality, a society would like to
distinguish between them according to desirable criteria. The following will be two very basic
requirements any society would like any regulation to comply with.
Efficiency requires that the first-best outcome is implemented in Nash equilibrium.
Efficiency: For all problems a and all et ∈ N (t, a), we have et = e∗.
10
The second property requires that the payments of the mechanism are budget-balancing
at Nash equilibrium.
Budget Balance: For all problems a and all et ∈ N (t, a), we have ∑i∈N ti(et) ≤ 0.
A budget balanced regulation mechanism t where N (t, a) is a singleton for any a, say
N (t, a) = {et}, induces a distribution rule φt of the total welfare. For any problem a, the
distribution rule implemented by the budget balanced mechanism t sets:
φti(a) = bi(e
t
i)−
∑
j∈Si
ajie
t
j + ti(e
t).
Any of the above regulation mechanisms is budget balanced and has a unique Nash equilibrium,
and hence, induces a corresponding distribution rule. We now focus on a particular regulation
mechanism, the one inspired by the polluter-pays principle.
4 A Characterization of the Polluter-Pays principle
In this section, we first describe the polluter-pays mechanism and show two of its properties,
namely budget balancedness and efficiency. Second, we examine the properties of the wel-
fare distribution rules implemented by regulation mechanisms in Nash equilibrium, and, in
particular by the polluter-pays welfare distribution rule.
4.1 The Polluter-Pays Mechanism
Many countries have adopted the “polluter-pays” (PP) principle as a regulation mechanism.
It basically renders the polluter responsible for the damage it causes to the environment. It
requires that the costs of pollution should be borne by the entity which profits from the process
that causes pollution. In order to satisfy the polluter-pays principle, the entity who pollutes
should compensate those who suffer from this pollution for the damages it causes. If a victim is
not fully compensated then he or she pays part of the cost of someone else’s pollution. Hence,
strictly speaking, the PP principle imposes not only that polluters pay for the damage caused
to society, but also that victims are fully compensated for those damages. In our model, an
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arbitrary agent i who pollutes should compensate every agent j ∈ R0i for the caused damage
aijei. Agent i pays aijei to every j ∈ R0i. Therefore, as a victim of pollution, agent i receives
the compensation ajiej from each agent j ∈ S0i who pollutes him. Summing up all these
side-payments, the polluter-pays principle leads to the regulation mechanism tPP (e) defined
as follows for any agent i ∈ N :
tPPi (e) =
∑
j∈S0i
ajiej −
∑
j∈R0i
aijei = di − aiiei −
∑
j∈R0i
aijei = di −
∑
j∈Ri
aijei. (4)
Agent i receives the net transfer from the cost of pollution he suffers minus the cost of pollution
he causes to society. Since the polluter-pays principle involves side-payments among agents,
the payments in the PP-mechanism sum up to zero. It is therefore budget-balanced. Agent
i’s welfare under the payments tPP (e) with emission plan e is:
bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Ri
aijei (5)
Since agent i pays for the marginal damage caused to others and is compensated from the
marginal damage caused by others, his welfare under the PP-mechanism in (5) is the social
benefit from his economic activity. Therefore, agent i has incentive to emit the efficient level
e∗i for any given emissions emitted by other agents. Formally, maximizing (5) with respect
to ei leads to the first-order condition (2) which implies eti = e
∗
i for every i ∈ N . This
implies that the PP-mechanism implements the efficient emission plan e∗ in Nash equilibrium,
i.e. N (tPP , a) = {e∗}. A particular feature of regulation through the PP-mechanism with
constant marginal damages is that, since any individual’s payoffs depend only on the agent’s
own choice (no externality), the efficient emission plan is a dominant strategy equilibrium,
which is an equilibrium concept which is less demanding in terms of cognitive skills than Nash
equilibrium. Therefore, the efficient emissions plan remains the unique Nash equilibrium when
the parameters a are publicly known but the benefit functions are private information. One
can even check that the efficient emissions plan is robust to collusion, i.e. it remains the
unique equilibrium in the PP mechanism even if we allow coalitions to jointly change their
emissions.7
7This is easily seen by the following argument: for any non-empty coalition S ⊆ N we have that (e∗i )i∈S
solves max(ei)i∈S≥0
∑
i∈S [bi(ei) + t
PP
i ((ej)j∈S , (e
∗
j )j∈N\S)].
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We will denote by φPP the polluter-pays (PP) distribution rule associating with each prob-
lem (N, b, a). Its polluter-pays welfare distribution φPP (a) is given by agent i’s equilibrium
welfare for every i ∈ N :
φPPi (a) = bi(e
∗
i )−
∑
j∈Ri
aije
∗
i . (6)
The result below follows straightforwardly from our discussion.
Proposition 1 The polluter-pays mechanism is an efficient and budget-balanced regulation
implementing the polluter-pays distribution rule.
4.2 The Polluter-Pays Distribution Rule
The following are two desirable criteria a society would like to be satisfied by the welfare
distributions implemented via a regulation mechanism. The first criterium requires that any
agent should receive a non-negative payoff.
Non-Negativity: For all problems a and all i ∈ N , φi(a) ≥ 0.
In the absence of pollution or emission activities, any agent’s welfare is zero and the state
of no pollution may be interpreted as status quo. Non-negativity simply requires that nobody
should be worse off under pollution than without pollution.
The second criterium renders the polluter responsible to any change of his pollution impact
on the economy.
Responsibility for Pollution Impact (RPI): Consider any arbitrary agent i ∈ N . Suppose
that agent i’s pollution impact is reduced from (aij)j∈N to (a′ij)j∈N with aij ≥ a′ij for all j ∈ N ,
and all other pollution impacts being unchanged (a′lj = alj for all l ∈ N\{i} and all j ∈ N).
The distribution rule φ renders agents responsible for their pollution impact if for any i ∈ N ,
any reduction a′ of i’s pollution impact from a,
φi(a′)− φi(a) = W (a′)−W (a).
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Responsibility for pollution impact (RPI) requires to assign to any agent the full return
or loss of any change of his own pollution impact.
In addition to being a fairness principle, RPI has attractive incentive properties. Suppose
that an agent is able to reduce his pollution impact at some cost by switching to a greener
technology, reducing or cleaning its wastes, improving energy efficiency or using less toxic
inputs. By assigning the full return of this pollution reduction, RPI provides efficient incentives
to invest in pollution impact reduction. Symmetrically, if an agent benefits from increasing
his pollution impact per unit of emissions (e.g. using higher sulfur content coal), RPI assigns
to this agent the economic cost of this extra pollution.
Among the above regulations, the Pigouvian fee regulation mechanism is efficient. It is
budget balanced if the revenue collected is redistributed to agents. The welfare distribution
it implements does not satisfy non-negativity since victim-only agents (i.e. agents i ∈ V ) are
not compensated for the environmental damage they incur. The welfare distribution with
the Pigouvian fee regulation mechanism also satisfies RPI. An emission norm e¯i = e∗i with a
persuasive fine (e.g. infinite) is efficient and budget balanced but its welfare distribution does
not satisfy RPI and non-negativity. A cap-and-trade system (tradable pollution allowances) for
pollution at each receptor with grandfathering is efficient and budget balanced but the welfare
distribution it leads to does not satisfy non-negativity since victims are not compensated
entirely. It might or might not satisfy RPI depending on the initial allocation of permits. A
similar cap-and-trade system where permits are auctioned satisfies efficiency and RPI but it
is not budget balanced unless the money collected is redistributed.
Theorem 1 The polluter-pays distribution rule is the unique distribution rule that satisfies
non-negativity and responsibility for pollution impact.
Proof. First, we show that if a distribution rule satisfies non-negativity and responsibility for
pollution impact, then it must be the polluter-pays distribution rule φPP . Consider another
distribution rule φ and let a be a problem. Let φ(a) = z˜ and φPP (a) = zPP . Let
∑
i∈N z˜i = W˜ .
Suppose that z˜ 6= zPP . Since ∑i∈N zPPi = W (a) and z˜ is a welfare distribution, we have
W˜ ≤ W (a). Thus, ∑i∈N z˜i ≤∑i∈N zPPi which, combined z˜ 6= zPP forces z˜i < zPPi for some
i ∈ N . Note that for all j ∈ V , zPPj = 0 and by non-negativity of φ, z˜j ≥ 0. Thus, we must
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have i ∈ N\V and both aii > 0 and eˆi > 0. Let a′ be such that a is a pollution impact
reduction for agent i from a′ such that aii < a′ii and everything else remains identical, i.e.
a′lj = alj for all l, j ∈ N such that lj 6= ii. Pick a′ii sufficiently large such that
bi(e
′lf
i ) < z
PP
i − z˜i (7)
where N (tlf , a′) = {e′lf}. Let φ(a′) = z˜′ and φPP (a′) = z′PP denote the distributions chosen
by φ and φPP for the problem (N, b, a′). By responsibility for pollution impact,
z˜i − z˜′i = zPPi − z′PPi
Rearranging terms and using the definition of zPPi this leads to
zPPi − z˜i = bi(e′∗i )−
∑
j∈Ri
a′ije
′∗
i − z˜′i, (8)
where e′∗ denotes the efficient emission plan for (N, b, a′). By non-negativity of φ, z˜′i ≥ 0.
Now since bi(e
′lf
i ) ≥ bi(e′∗i ), a′ij ≥ 0 for all j ∈ Ri, and z′i ≥ 0, we obtain from (7),
zPPi − z˜i > bi(e′lfi ) ≥ bi(e′∗i )−
∑
j∈Ri
a′ije
′∗
i − z˜′i,
which contradicts (8).
Second, we show that φPP satisfies non-negativity and responsibility for pollution impact.
For non-negativity,
zPPi = bi(e
∗
i )−
∑
j∈Ri
aije
∗
i = max
ei≥0
bi(ei)−∑
j∈Ri
aijei
 ≥ bi(0)−∑
j∈Ri
aij × 0 = 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that agent i can always choose ei = 0 (no emission
or production).
For responsibility for pollution impact, for any agent i, consider any reduction of i’s pol-
lution impact from a to a′: aij ≥ a′ij for all j ∈ N and (akj)j∈N = (a′kj)j∈N for any k 6= i.
Let φPP (a) = zPP and φPP (a′) = z′PP . Let W (a) and W (a′) denote the corresponding total
welfare in (N, b, a) and (N, b, a′), respectively. Note that by efficiency of tPP , we have both
WPP (a) = W (a) and WPP (a′) = W (a′). Similarly, denote by e∗ and e′∗ the efficient emission
plan of (N, b, a) and (N, b, a′), respectively. By definition,
z′PPi − zPPi = b(e′∗i )−
∑
j∈Ri
a′ije
′∗
ij −
b(e∗i )−∑
j∈Ri
aije
∗
ij
 . (9)
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Since akj = a′kj for every k 6= i, the efficient emission levels are not affected by the change of
matrix of pollution impacts from a to a′ which implies e∗k = e
′∗
k for every k ∈ N\i. Therefore,
we have:
W (a′)−W (a) = b(e′∗i )−
∑
j∈Ri
a′ije
′∗
ij −
b(e∗i )−∑
j∈Ri
aije
∗
ij

which, combined with (9), leads to z′PPi − zPPi = W ′PP −WPP . 
Because for any problem a, φPP (a) is an efficient welfare distribution, Theorem 1 shows
that non-negativity and responsibility for pollution impact imply efficiency.
5 Acceptability of the polluter-pays principle
In modern societies, environmental regulations emerge from negotiation among stakeholders.
Sovereign countries bargain to design environmental international agreements such as the
Kyoto protocol. Firms, public authorities and NGO are involved in the debates on the design
of regulations. In this section, we analyze such negotiations using a cooperative game theory
approach. We examine whether the polluter-pays mechanism is the preferred mechanism for
any possible coalition of agents. That is if a group of agents can be better-off by agreeing
on another way to regulate externalities among them and leaving out the other agents. For
instance, in the case of international agreements, a group of countries would refuse to agree to
apply the polluter-pays mechanism if it can achieve a higher welfare with another agreement
among them. Alternatively, some countries may refuse to sign a global agreement and only a
subcoalition of the grand coalition signs the agreement and cooperates while the non-signatory
countries choose their emissions non-cooperatively.
Our analysis requires additional notation from cooperative game theory. Throughout this
section we suppose that (N, b, a) is fixed and zPP = φPP (a). A coalition T is a non-empty
subset of N . For any coalition T , let eT = (ei)i∈T . We need to define the welfare that a
coalition T can achieve by agreeing on a regulation mechanism. This welfare depends on the
behavior of agents outside the coalition. We assume that if a coalition T forms, then the
members of T agree to implement the mechanism that maximizes their joint payoff given the
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behavior of agents outside T . As outlined above, here we assume that agents outside of T
behave non-cooperatively.8 For our purpose of computing T ’s welfare, this is equivalent to
agree on an emission plan eT among members of T . Agents outside T simply choose their
laissez-faire emissions.
More precisely, for any coalition T and emissions e′j for agents j ∈ N\T outside T , members
of coalition T would implement the solution to:
max
(ei)i∈T∈RT+
∑
i∈T
bi(ei)−
∑
j∈T
ajiej +
∑
j∈N\T
ajie
′
j
 .
The first-order conditions defines the emissions eT of members of coalition T :
b′i(e
T
i ) =
∑
j∈Ri∩T
aij , (10)
for all i ∈ T , and we set eTi = elfi for all i ∈ N\T . Importantly, with constant marginal damage,
coalition T ’s emissions do not depend on the outsider emissions (e′j)j∈N\T . In particular, the
members of T choose the same emissions if the others agents coordinate their emissions (by
forming coalitions) or not. Each agent i ∈ T internalizes his impact on the environmental
damage only to members of T . Therefore, for any i ∈ T , eTi weakly decreases as T expands.
For each coalition T , eT defined by (10) determines the welfare T can achieve:
v(T ) =
∑
i∈T
bi(eTi )−
∑
j∈T
ajie
T
j +
∑
j∈N\T
ajie
T
j
 .
We call v(T ) the non-cooperative core lower bound for coalition T . This is the maximum
welfare T can achieve by cooperation while agents outside T behave non-cooperatively.
Non-Cooperative Core Lower Bounds: A welfare distribution z satisfies non-cooperative
core lower bounds if for every T ⊆ N , ∑i∈T zi ≥ v(T ).
Not surprisingly, the polluter-pays welfare distribution does not necessarily satisfy non-
cooperative lower bounds because big polluters might decide to stay alone even when all other
agents behave non-cooperatively.
8That is to say they do not form any cooperating coalitions of size greater than or equal to two.
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Proposition 2 The polluter-pays welfare distribution zPP might not satisfy non-cooperative
core lower bounds.
Proof. First, note that for any agent i,
zPPi = bi(e
∗
i )−
∑
j∈Ri
aije
∗
i = bi(e
∗
i )− aiie∗i −
∑
j∈R0i
aije
∗
i
and the non-cooperative core lower bound for T = {i} is
v(i) = bi(e
lf
i )− aiielfi −
∑
j∈S0i
ajie
lf
j
Since elfi maximizes bi(ei)− aiiei, as long as agent i exerts some externalities, i.e. R0i 6= ∅, a
sufficient condition for the core lower bound for coalition {i} to be violated, i.e. for zPPi < v(i),
is ∑
j∈R0i
aije
∗
i ≥
∑
j∈S0i
ajie
lf
j . (11)
Obviously, (11) holds if agent i is not polluted by others, i.e. S0i = ∅. More generally, it holds
when the damage from others at the laissez-faire is lower than the damage to others at the
first-best. In this case, the payment imposed to agent i by the polluter-pays principle exceeds
the laissez-faire cost of pollution for i. One can easily find examples where (11) is violated
with unilateral externalities. With multilateral externalities S0i = R0i and, therefore, (11)
becomes:∑
j∈S0i
aije
∗
i ≥
∑
j∈S0i
ajie
lf
j .
The above condition holds if i has a large marginal impact on the others while the others have
a low impact on i. Then i is required to pay a lot when his gain is low. Here also we can find
examples where the last inequality is violated with multilateral externalities. 
Proposition 2 and its proof implies that some countries might not sign a global agreement
because they prefer to stay alone (while some other coalition forms). For example, a country
might refuse to ratify an international agreement for emissions reduction (e.g. the Kyoto
Protocol) because its impact on others is much larger than the pollution it suffers from others.
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This is exactly captured in (11). Also note that for the above conclusions for such a country
it is irrelevant whether all countries behave non-cooperatively or a coalition forms and all
others behave non-cooperatively: if some coalition cooperates, then their emissions are reduced
from laissez-faire and the pollution impact is smaller on this country (like the United States)
than under laissez-faire. More precisely, a country prefers all other countries to sign the
international environmental agreement while they do not sign it!
Interestingly, the polluter-pays welfare distribution satisfies all non-cooperative core lower
bounds in a symmetric pollution environment, i.e. where all benefit functions are identical
and pollution impacts are the same across all agents.
Proposition 3 Under multilateral externalities and homogenous agents where for all i, j ∈ N ,
b = bi = bj and a = aij = aji, the polluter-pays welfare distribution zPP satisfies the non-
cooperative core lower bounds.
Proof. For all i, j ∈ N , let b = bi = bj and a = aij = aji. Since aii > 0 for all i ∈ N , we have
Si = Ri = N for all i ∈ N . Let ∅ 6= T ⊆ N .
Now for all i ∈ T ,
zPPi = b(e
∗
i )−
∑
j∈N
ae∗i
= b(e∗i )− e∗i
∑
j∈N
a
= max
ei≥0
b(ei)− ei∑
j∈N
a

≥ b(eTi )− eTi
∑
j∈N
a
= b(eTi )−
∑
j∈T
aeTi −
∑
j∈N\T
aeTi
≥ b(eTi )−
∑
j∈T
aeTj −
∑
j∈N\T
aeTj .
where the first equality is the definition of the polluter-pays welfare distribution, the second
follows from the fact that in the homogenous case, for all j ∈ N , e∗i = e∗j , and the last
inequality follows from the fact that in the homogenous case, for all j ∈ T , eTi = eTj , and that
for all j ∈ N\T , eTi ≤ elfi = elfj = eTj .
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Now the above implies
∑
i∈T
zPPi ≥
∑
i∈T
b(eTi )−∑
j∈T
aeTj −
∑
j∈N\T
aeTj
 = v(T ).
Hence, zPP satisfies non-cooperative core lower bounds, the desired conclusion. 
Proposition 3 shows that in homogenous environments no coalition has an incentive to leave
a global agreement where the polluter-pays principle is applied. As in real life applications,
society may decide that a global agreement is only enforced if all agents sign it (and otherwise
laissez-faire or a partial agreement is adopted). In the homogenous case all agents weakly
prefer signing the global agreement instead of discarding it.
6 Generalization to increasing marginal damage
We now consider the polluter-pays principle with convex damage functions which requires a
slight modification of the model. We differentiate emissions from pollution and damage. The
emission plan e generates a pollution level pi at i’s location (to receptor i) defined by:
pi =
∑
j∈Si
ajiej . (12)
The matrix a defines now the transfer coefficients that translates emissions of i into pollution
of j (e.g. waste water released by i into water pollution concentration on j). Pollution at level
pi causes damages di(pi) to i with di being increasing and convex: di(0) = 0, d′i(pi) > 0 and
d′′i (pi) ≥ 0 for every pi ∈ R+ and i ∈ N\P .9 The welfare of agent i with emissions e = (ei)i∈N
is:
bi(ei)− di(pi), (13)
where pi is defined by (12). A pollution problem is now described by (N, b, a, d).
9Recall that P is the set of only polluter agents.
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The first-order conditions that characterize the efficient emission plan e∗ (which maximizes
the total welfare
∑
i∈N [bi(ei)− di(pi)]) are for every i ∈ N :10
b′i(e
∗
i ) =
∑
j∈Ri
aijd
′
j(p
∗
j ) =
∑
j∈Ri
aijd
′
j(
∑
l∈Sj
alje
∗
l ). (14)
The marginal benefit of agent i’s emission should be equal to its marginal cost for society
which depends on its marginal impact on pollution aij and the marginal damage of pollution
at each receptor j ∈ Ri. Each unit of emission from agent i leads to aij units of pollution at
receptor j which causes marginal damages evaluated to aijd′j(p
∗
j ). The total welfare with the
efficient emission plan e∗ is:
W (a) =
∑
i∈N
[bi(e∗i )− di(p∗i )] =
∑
i∈N
[bi(e∗i )− di(
∑
j∈Si
ajie
∗
j )].
In contrast with constant marginal damages (i.e. the first-order condition in (2)), with in-
creasing marginal damage the efficient level of i’s emission (the first-order condition in (14))
depends on what is emitted by the other polluters of j with j being a receptor of i’s pollution
(j ∈ Ri). Marginal damage being increasing with pollution concentration, agent i’s emission
has more impact on damages at j when pollutant emitted by other polluters in R0j increases.
Because a polluter’s marginal impact depends on pollution concentration due to other pol-
luters, applying the polluter-pays principle in this framework is not straightforward. One
needs to define each polluter’s responsibility on the damage caused to society when comput-
ing the “cost of pollution of one entity on others”. With only one single polluter i, it is easy:
agent i should pay the damage dj(aijej) to victim j. However, with more than one polluter
at a receptor j, say i and k, the PP principle does not tell us how to share dj(aijei + akjek)
(the overall cost at j) among i and k. If polluter i is held responsible for the first aijej units
of pollution, he has to pay dj(aijei). If polluter i is responsible for the last ones, he has to
pay d(aijei + akjek) − dj(akjek) which is larger than dj(aijei) by convexity of dj . It is also
10The existence of the efficient emission plan e∗ is guaranteed by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem: define
g : ×i∈N [0, eˆi] −→ ×i∈N [0, eˆi] by g(e) = ((b′i)−1(
∑
j∈Ri aijd
′
j(
∑
l∈Sj aljel)))i∈N . Since bi is strictly concave, b
′
i
tends to infinity at zero, and b′i tends to zero at eˆi, g is a well defined function. Our assumptions on damages
ensure that g is continuous. Now since ×i∈N [0, eˆi] is compact and convex, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem
implies that the function g must have a fixed point which is a solution to (14). Uniqueness of e∗ follows from
strict concavity of the benefits and the convexity of the damages.
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increasing with the other polluter k’s emissions. One can think about several ways to share
the damage dj(pj). For instance, it could be assigned proportionally to a polluter’s share on
total pollution, each polluter i paying aijeipj dj(pj) to j for every i ∈ Rj.
Such a division of the damage is defined for given emissions by i and k. Yet, since emissions
are substitutes for receptor j, the presence of i’s emissions at j leads to a reduction of k’s
emissions ek at the first-best. The inter-connection of polluters’ efficient emissions with convex
damage creates a further cost of pollution on society: i’s emission do not only cause damage
at j, it also encroaches on k’s emission at the first-best.
In this framework, we interpret the PP principle of making paying the “cost of pollution
of one entity on others” by charging a polluter the incremental impact of his emissions on
other agents. Due to increasing marginal damage, we can distinguish between two impacts.
A first one is an increase of damage at each receptor j ∈ Ri. The second one is due to the
substitution between polluters’ emissions for each receptor j: if i emits more pollution, then
each polluter k ∈ Sj should emit less at the first-best. We also interpret the PP principle by
compensating each agent exactly for the damage caused by others’ emissions in absence of his
emission. Let us denote by e0i the efficient emission without i’s emission for every i ∈ N (with
fixing e0ii = 0). Notice that e
0i is the efficient plan of an economy without i’s emission but with
i’s damage function di (i.e. agent i is then a “victim only”). It maximizes the total welfare of
the problem (N, b−i, a, d) where by b−i implicitly means that agent i becomes a victim. The
polluter-pays regulation mechanism tPP is defined for every i ∈ N by:
tPPi (e) = di(p
0i
i )−
∑
j 6=i
[
bj(e0ij )− dj(p0ij )− (bj(ej)− dj(pj))
]
. (15)
The transfer is decomposed in two terms. The left-hand term is agent i’s damage at the
first-best without i’s emissions. The summation is the economic loss due to i’s emission for
all other agents. A polluter j who is victim of i’s pollution, the transfer is simply the loss of
benefit bj(e0ij ) − bj(ej). For a polluter j who is a victim of i’s pollution it is the change of
welfare including damage bj(e0ij )− dj(p0i)− (bj(ej)− dj(pj)). For a victim only agent i ∈ V ,
the PP transfer reduces to the first term which is the damage at the first-best di(p∗i ).
The PP mechanism yields to agent i a total welfare of (noting bi(e0ii ) = bi(0) = 0):
bi(ei)− di(pi) + tPPi (e) =
∑
j∈N
[
bj(ej)− dj(pj)− (bj(e0ij )− dj(p0ij ))
]
. (16)
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Agent i’s welfare under the PP regulation mechanism is his emission’s contribution to total
welfare for any emission plan. Since each agent i internalizes the impact of his own emissions
on total welfare given the other agent’s emissions, the PP principle implements the efficient
emission plan e∗. Indeed, given other agent’s emissions et−i, the maximization of agent i’s
welfare
bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Ri
dj(aijei +
∑
l∈Sj\i
alje
t
j) +
∑
j∈N\i
bj(etj)−
∑
j∈N\Ri
dj(ptj)−
∑
i∈N
(bj(e0ij )− dj(p0ij ))
with respect to ei leads to the first-order conditions in (14) of the efficient emission plan e∗.
Therefore, et = e∗ for any et ∈ N (t, a). Agent i’s equilibrium welfare is thus by (16):
φPPi (a) = bi(e
∗
i )− di(p∗i ) + tPPi (e∗) = W (a)−
∑
j∈N
(bj(e0ij )− dj(p0ij )). (17)
where W (a) =
∑
j∈N (bj(e
∗
j ) − dj(p∗j )) = WPP (a). Similarly as before, we call φPP the
polluter-pays distribution rule (induced by tPP for convex damages). Agent i’s welfare is the
incremental contribution of his emissions at the first-best. For a victim only agent i ∈ V , it
simplifies to zero since he is fully compensated for the damage di(p∗i ). A polluter only agent
i ∈ P obtains his first-best benefit bi(e∗i ) net of the negative impact of his emissions on society∑
j 6=i
[
bj(e∗j )− dj(p∗j )− (bj(e0ij )− dj(p0ij ))
]
. Note that since e0ij = e
∗
j with constant marginal
damages for every j 6= i the PP mechanism defined in (15) is a generalization of the one defined
in (4) to convex damage functions. The next proposition shows that tPP is budget-balanced.
Proposition 4 The polluter-pays mechanism is an efficient and budget-balanced regulation
implementing the polluter-pays distribution rule.
Proof. It remains to be shown that tPP is budget-balanced. Since tPP is efficient, it suffices
to show
∑
i∈N t
PP
i (e
∗) ≤ 0. Note that since ei0 is an efficient emission plan of the problem
(N, b−i, a, d) while the emission plan (e∗−i, 0) can be implemented in (N, b−i, a, d), we have∑
j∈N
[
bj(e0ij )− dj(p0ij )
] ≥ −di(p∗i − aiie∗i ) +∑
j 6=i
[
bj(e∗j )− dj(p∗j − aije∗i )
]
.
Multiplying both sides with -1, we combine the above inequality with the definition of tPP (e)
in (15) at the first-best and use bi(e0ii ) = bi(0) = 0 and aij = 0 for j /∈ Ri, and obtain:
tPPi (e
∗) ≤ di(p∗i − aiie∗i )−
∑
j∈R0i
[
dj(p∗j )− dj(p∗j − aije∗i )
]
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Summing up all transfers tPPi leads to:∑
i∈N
tPPi (e
∗) ≤
∑
i∈N
(di(p∗i − aiie∗i )−
∑
j∈R0i
[
dj(p∗j )− dj(p∗j − aije∗i )
]
)
Rearranging terms yields:∑
i∈N
tPPi (e
∗) ≤
∑
i∈N
(di(p∗i − aiie∗i )−
∑
j∈S0i
[di(p∗i )− di(p∗i − ajie∗j )]). (18)
Consider any i ∈ N . Without loss of generality, let Si = {1, . . . , s}. Since p∗i =
∑
j∈Si ajie
∗
j ,
we can rewrite di(p∗i ) by:
di(p∗i ) =
s∑
k=1
[di(p∗i −
k−1∑
j=1
ajie
∗
j )− di(p∗i −
k∑
j=1
ajie
∗
j )] (19)
Note that for any k = 1, . . . , s, p∗i −
∑k−1
j=1 ajie
∗
j − (p∗i −
∑k
j=1 ajie
∗
j ) = akie
∗
k = p
∗
i − (p∗i −akie∗k)
Thus, by convexity of di, for any k = 1, . . . , s,
di(p∗i −
k−1∑
j=1
ajie
∗
j )− di(p∗i −
k∑
j=1
ajie
∗
j ) ≤ di(p∗i )− di(p∗i − akie∗k) (20)
Combining (19) with (20) for any k = 1, . . . , s leads to:
di(p∗i ) ≤
s∑
k=1
[di(p∗i )− di(p∗i − akie∗k)] =
∑
j∈Si
[di(p∗i )− di(p∗i − ajie∗j )].
By Si = S0i ∪ {i}, this is equivalent to:
di(p∗i − aiie∗i ) ≤
∑
j∈S0i
[
di(p∗i )− di(p∗i − ajie∗j )
]
.
The last inequality combined with (18) leads to the desired conclusion. 
Notice that as along as two polluters impact the same receptors, the PP distribution rule
does not distribute total welfare in the sense that
∑
i∈N φ
PP
i (a) < W (a). To see that, suppose
that N = {1, 2, 3} with polluter 1 and 3 polluting only a victim 2, i.e. ai2 > 0 for i = 1, 3.
Then polluter 1 has to pay the incremental damage at 2, formally d2(a12e∗1+a32e∗3)−d2(a32e013 )
as well as the loss of benefit for 3, that is b3(e013 ) − b3(e∗3). Similarly polluter 3 has to pay
for increment damages at 2 and benefit loss for 1 due to his emissions. The victim 2 receives
a compensation equals to the damage d2(p∗2). Yet, the total payment by 1 and 3 more than
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offsets the compensation to 2: tPP1 (e
∗) + tPP3 (e∗) + tPP2 (e∗2) < 0 because −tPP1 (e∗)− tPP3 (e∗) >
tPP2 (e
∗
2) = d2(a12e
∗
1 + a32e
∗
3). The PP regulation mechanism exhibits a financial surplus and,
therefore, the PP regulation rule distributes strictly less than total welfare.
To characterize the PP distribution rule φPP with marginal increasing damages, we in-
troduce a further fairness principle, called solidarity upper bounds. Its motivation relies on
polluters’ minimal claims when applying the PP principle. To minimize his payment, a polluter
would claim responsibility only on the damage impact due to his own emission in absence of any
other pollution at each receptor j ∈ Ri (including himself). Under this interpretation of the
PP principle each agent i would enjoy an individual welfare of maxei≥0[bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Ri dj(aijej)]
for a given emission plan e. On the other hand, applying the PP principle requires to fully
compensate any agent j for the damage dj(pj). With (strictly) convex damage functions we
have
∑
i∈Sj dj(aijei) < dj(pj) = dj
(∑
i∈Si aijei
)
whenever |Si| > 1, and such an interpreta-
tion of the polluter pays principle would lead to unbalanced transfers. One way to reconcile
a distribution rule (or budget-balanced transfers) with the above claims is to impose that,
by solidarity, no agent should get more than the claimed stand-alone welfare. This solidarity
principle is given in the following requirement.
Solidarity Upper Bounds: For all problems a and all i ∈ N , φi(a) ≤ maxei≥0[bi(ei) −∑
j∈Ri dj(aijei)].
A second, and more fundamental, justification of solidarity upper bounds finds its roots
in Moulin’s notion of group externality (Moulin, 1990). Under increasing marginal damage,
the presence of pollution from other sources might reduce the ability of a polluter to emit.
Formally, let us denote by e0−ii polluter i’s efficient emission when i is the only polluter to emit
(ej = 0 for every j 6= i). It is the efficient emission plan to the problem (N, bi, a, d) (where
bi means that all agents in N\i become victims). It is also the solution to the maximization
problem in the solidarity upper bounds property. Note that if there exist j ∈ Ri and k ∈ Sj
with k 6= i, then e0ii > e∗i : agent i could pollute more in the absence of k. Doing so, under the
PP regulation mechanism tPP , he could enjoy a welfare of bi(e0−ii ) − di(p0−ii ) + tPPi (e0−i) =
maxei≥0[bi(ei) −
∑
j∈Ri dj(aijei)], which is higher than his welfare under the emission plan
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e∗. In Moulin’s terms, the presence of other polluters exhibits a negative group externality
on polluter i. Solidarity upper bounds requires that every polluter who creates this negative
group externality should take up a share of it. For victim only polluters i ∈ V , the solidarity
upper bound is equal to zero which is their welfare under the PP mechanism.
We now provide our characterization of the PP principle generalized to increasing marginal
damages.
Theorem 2 The polluter-pays distribution rule is the unique distribution rule that satisfies
non-negativity, responsibility for pollution impact and the solidarity upper bounds.
Proof. Let φ be a distribution rule satisfying non-negativity, responsibility for pollution
impact and the solidarity upper bounds. Let a be a problem, φ(a) = z and φPP (a) = y∗.
Suppose that z 6= y∗. Note that for all i ∈ V , by non-negativity and solidarity upper bounds,
zi = 0 = y∗i . Thus, there exists i ∈ N\V such that zi 6= y∗i .
Let a′ii > aii. Consider the problem where aii changes to a
′
ii and everything else remains
identical, i.e. a′ = (a−ii, a′ii). Let φ(a
′) = z′, φPP (a′) = y′∗, and e′∗ denote the efficient
emission plan for a′.
By RPI,
zi − z′i = W (a)−W (a′) = y∗i − y′∗i .
Now we may take limits, i.e.
lim
a′ii→+∞
zi − z′i = lim
a′ii→+∞
W (a)−W (a′)
= lim
a′ii→+∞
y∗i − y′∗i ,
and we obtain
zi − lim
a′ii→+∞
z′i = W (a)− lim
a′ii→+∞
W (a′)
= y∗i − lim
a′ii→+∞
y′∗i .
Note that lima′ii→+∞maxei≥0[bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Ri dj(a
′
ijei)] = 0. Therefore, by non-negativity and
solidarity upper bounds, both lima′ii→+∞ z
′
i = 0 = lima′ii→+∞ y
′∗
i . But now we obtain
zi = W (a)− lim
a′ii→+∞
W (a′) = y∗i ,
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which contradicts zi 6= y∗i .
Second, we show that φPP satisfies RPI, non-negativity and solidarity upper bounds. From
(17) it is straightforward that φPP satisfies RPI because e0i is optimal for both (N, b−i, a, d)
and (N, b−i, a′, d) whenever i’s pollution impact is reduced (with a′lj = alj for all l ∈ N\{i}
and all j ∈ N). Since e0i can be implemented as an emissions plan in the problem (N, b, a, d),
W (a) ≥ ∑j∈N (bj(e0ij ) − dj(p0ij )) and, therefore, by (17), φPP satisfies non-negativity. For
solidarity upper bounds, first note that by convexity of dj ,11 we have for any ei ≥ 0,
dj(aijei) ≤ dj(aijei + p∗−ij )− dj(p∗−ij ),
where p∗−ij =
∑
k∈Rj\i akje
∗
k. Therefore, for any i ∈ N and ei ≥ 0,
bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Ri
(
dj(aijei + p∗−ij )− dj(p∗ij )
)
≤ bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Ri
dj(aijei).
Maximizing both sides of the inequality with respect to ei leads to:
bi(e∗i )−
∑
j∈Ri
(
dj(p∗j )− dj(p∗j − aije∗i )
) ≤ max
ei≥0
[bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Ri
dj(aijei)]. (21)
Second, since e0i maximizes −di(pi) +
∑
j∈N\i(bj(ej) − dj(pj)) while (0, e∗−i) is a possible
emission plan for (N, b−i, a, d), it yields a higher total welfare:
−di(p0ii ) +
∑
j∈N\i
(bj(e0ij )− dj(p0ij )) ≥ −di(p∗i − aiie∗i ) +
∑
j∈N\i
(bj(e∗j )− dj(p∗j − aije∗i )).
Multiplying both sides by −1, adding W (a) to both sides, and using the definition of φPP in
(17) yields:
φPPi (a) ≤ bi(e∗i )−
∑
j∈Ri
(dj(p∗j )− dj(p∗j − aije∗i )).
The last inequality combined with (21) shows that solidarity upper bounds holds for all i ∈
N . 
7 Conclusion: PP versus VCG
We conclude by comparing the PP mechanism with the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mecha-
nism applied to economies with externalities. A VCG mechanism would make each agent pay
11Note that dj(0) = 0 and therefore, dj is superadditive: dj(u) + dj(v) ≤ dj(u + v) for any u, v ∈ R+.
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or receive his impact on total welfare. Let e−i∗ denote the efficient emission plan that maxi-
mizes the total welfare without i defined by
∑
j 6=i(bj(ej) − dj(p−ij )) with p−ij =
∑
l∈Sj\i aljel.
The VCG mechanism tV CG assigns to every i ∈ N :
tV CGi (e) =
∑
j 6=i
(bj(ej)− dj(pj))−
∑
j 6=i
(bj(e−i∗j )− dj(p−i∗j )).
Under the VCG mechanism, each agent i obtains the total welfare net of the welfare without
i at the first-best. Therefore, agent i internalizes the impact of his emission on society which
means that the VCG mechanism is efficient, i.e. N (tV CG, a) = {e∗}. It leads to the VCG-
distribution rule φV CG defined for every i ∈ N by:
φV CGi (a) = W (a)−
∑
j 6=i
(bj(e−i∗j )− dj(p−i∗j )).
Each agent i ∈ N obtains the difference between the welfare with and without him at the first-
best. In case of unilateral externalities, for a victim-only agent i ∈ V , φV CGi (a) < 0 because i’s
presence in the economy reduces total welfare. Therefore, non-negativity of the distribution
rule induced by tV CG is violated. Indeed, agent i does not only bring his damage di to the
economy which diminishes welfare, it also forces polluters j ∈ Si to reduce their emissions.
Hence, in addition to not being compensated for the damage di(p∗i ), a victim i has to pay for the
loss of welfare which his presence causes to the polluters, namely
∑
j∈Si[(bj(e
−i∗
j )−dj(p−i∗j ))−
(b∗j (e
∗)− dj(p∗j ))]. For a polluter-only agent i ∈ P , the PP and VCG welfare coincide because
e0ij = e
−i∗
j for every j ∈ N\i while di = 0 for any i ∈ P . Therefore φPPi (a) = φV CGi (a) for
any i ∈ P . With multilateral externalities pollution is a public bad and the pollution problem
is closer to the public good provision framework in which the Clark-Groves mechanism has
been put forward. Although the VCG mechanism satisfies responsibility for pollution impact
(RPI) and the solidarity upper bounds, it fails to satisfy non-negativity. An agent i adds both
new emission ei and new damage di to the welfare. Agent i pollutes other agents and forces
in addition them to reduce their own emissions from e−i∗j to e
∗
j for every j ∈ Si and j ∈ Sk\i
where k ∈ Ri for convex damage function di. Therefore, under multilateral externalities, we
may have tV CGi (e
∗) < 0. It is easy to found examples in which the negative impact of his
presence tV CGi (e
∗) to society is not compensated by the i’s net benefit bi(e∗i ) − di(p∗i ) at the
first-best so that φV CGi (a) < 0 for every i ∈ N . Under the PP principle, agents pay for the
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negative impact of their emissions on society not their damage. They are indeed compensated
for that.
There are important differences between the VCG and the PP mechanism. Although
both implement the efficient allocation of pollution emissions as a unique Nash equilibrium,
only the PP principle distributes the welfare to satisfy responsibility for pollution impact
and non-negativity (for constant marginal damages) and solidarity upper bounds (for convex
damages). Similarly, the mechanisms proposed by Duggan and Roberts (2002) and Montero
(2008) allocate pollution emissions efficiently. The advantage of the PP mechanism is that, in
addition to achieving efficiency, it distributes the welfare fairly in the sense of the above three
requirements. Our results strongly support the use of our interpretation of the PP principle
in pollution environment
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